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The Smiler Incident 02/06/2015


Ian-S

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I find it funny that people seem to believe that overriding the system is such a big deal. Even if the story that the Fail on Sunday published turns out to be true, it is standard procedure to override a block section should, say, the ride system not pick up a train the just cleared a block section - the only weird thing about this incident is really the fact that the op, who (as shown before) had a clear view of where the train stalled didn't radio through to the engineer that it had stalled as the engineer, who may or may not have overriden then computer, could not see from the MCBR or quite possibly on the route they would have taken to actually get to it. :)

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I've heard (once again all speculation) that the engineer and operator may have put the ride into manual override in order to carry out a lift hill evacuation. As the train full of people was reportedly stopped towards the top of the lift hill, a computer failure may have occured and advanced the train off the lift hill instead of reversing it like instructed by the operator to perform a much safer evacuation.

Until details might be officialy released it's not fair to point the finger at anyone and it's also worth noting that if this incident was a genuine mistake by an engineer then they will be needing all the support they can get as well as they will be feeling horrible right now. I think it's only fair to respect everyone involved in the incident until official details are released.

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a computer failure may have occured and advanced the train off the lift hill instead of reversing it like instructed by the operator to perform a much safer evacuation.

 

But reversing a train down a lift hill goes against all rollercoaster mechanical design - the train & track is designed so it would never be able to move backwards down the lift. Also computer controllers don't just get random errors that cause the wrong actions to occur when a different button is pressed. So this can't be the reason at all.

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That is true usually, but The smiler is unique in that it IS designed to reverse trains down the lift hill, hence the fins on the lift hills that you don't usually see. I may be wrong, but think it is the first ever rollercoaster featuring a lift hill designed this way. Here it is in action on the second lift hill

 

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I find it funny that people seem to believe that overriding the system is such a big deal. Even if the story that the Fail on Sunday published turns out to be true, it is standard procedure to override a block section should, say, the ride system not pick up a train the just cleared a block section - the only weird thing about this incident is really the fact that the op, who (as shown before) had a clear view of where the train stalled didn't radio through to the engineer that it had stalled as the engineer, who may or may not have overriden then computer, could not see from the MCBR or quite possibly on the route they would have taken to actually get to it. :)

 

Mainly because the block system that rollercoasters employ is infallible. Block breaks automatically close until the next part of the track is clear and this is what happened at The Smiler because we know from witness reports that the train was stopped on the lift hill. What shouldn't be possible is that you can just over-ride the safety systems particularly in the event of a stalled train. 

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I think over-riding the systems should be possible, since you will obviously need to do it in situations (even in this one, how will you move the train from the lift hill after an evacuation?)... Vampire is a good example when it is sometimes picky about the restraints not being down, even though the entire train is buckled up correctly (I doubt ops are allowed to over-ride it anymore though)

 

There needs to be a sense of manual over-ride on anything because computers can and do get it wrong from time to time (especially when most rides still use XP ;) )... That the paper are claiming this to be a REVELATION of how dangerous life is amuses me greatly...

 

Unfortunately, human error can never be accounted for... The question really is what happened to make the ride move forward, and did the people in the op box notice the stalled train? The latter question has to be yes, especially with staff on the entrance and surrounding guests presumably raising attention to this...

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OO I forgot about this, but 80% sure this is the second lift only (purely because it is vertical). Is lift 1 designed like this too? I really don't think so but can't remember to be honest.

 

The first lift hill is the same. No anti-roll backs - designed to be safer so that the train can be sent backwards and evacuated down on ground level (prevents any risk of a mistake happening 60ft+ in the air). 

 

I have speculated from the start that an engineer/team manually over-rid so they could undergo this procedure after the computer detected the stalled train and shut the ride off. However, either human error or computer fault ran the chain forwards rather than backwards. If human error, I guess the fix would need to be that they can never be ran forward again - the system should still have prevented it.

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Pure speculation here, assuming that the accident was caused by an engineer overriding a safety feature, I've always wondered whether the engineer was aware of how many cars were on the ride, they had made multiple visits to the ride earlier in the morning for problems and according to all accounts, the ride operators decided to add another car to speed up the throughput because the queue was long.

So, last time the engineer came there were 4 cars, the time there were 5 but he didn't know, looked at everything, counted three cars in the station, one stuck on the lift hill and thought oh this dam ride is on it's monthly again, just restart it.

My belief in this scenario was further endorsed at Thorpe on Friday when they took at car off the Swarm, there wasn't an engineer in sight, just the ride operator who came down from the control room to take the car off then went back up and restarted the ride (took all of 4 minutes), the engineers were over at Stealth fixing it.

There used to be a saying 'assumptions are dangerous' but I always see people basing decisions/actions on assumptions nowadays.

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"Our revelations – particularly the fact that staff are able to perform manual overrides at all – will raise disturbing questions about the safety features on the Smiler and other rides." 

 

Well thank god the Daily Mail is taking the time to investigate these matters! What would we do without them?! -_-

 

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Well it's an angle that the GP aren't really aware of, so is of interest.

 

I'm glad that this is out, as it may help the park have the ride opened for next season. If they can show that they have developed a better system for engineering and ride mode operation/procedures, that's better than the ride having something faulty technically.

 

Alton will have known from the start this was human error, so good on them for quietly dealing with this angle behind the scenes. Must be scary tho, as anyone who has ever worked for Merlin know; they do love an internal investigation or disciplinary.

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An engineer is always needed when taking off or putting on a train

Did you miss the bit where I said they were all working on Stealth?

One person came down from the Swarm control room, pushed a few buttons, took the train off, came back from engineering a few minutes later, returned to the control room and sent the remaining train round once to test it, then let us on.

He was still there 2 hours later in the control room pushing the two buttons to launch the ride, so I guess he was an engineer moonlighting as a ride op then yes?

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I'm glad that this is out, as it may help the park have the ride opened for next season. If they can show that they have developed a better system for engineering and ride mode operation/procedures, that's better than the ride having something faulty technically.

It's my guess that the ride will reopen very shortly after the H&S report is published. That will be the point the actual cause is publicly confirmed and I'm sure the report will explicitly state that procedures put in place since mean it can not happen again. They can then use that snippet to allay fears from the public and shut the press up if they go all outragey. Both the publishing and the opening will be big things in the press, may as well combine them and get it all out the way at once.
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Ian, ride operators don't even have access to the areas of the ride controls that are required for this sort of action. It would've been a TL or an engineer. At thorpe the uniforms are all practically the same for all the people who work on rides at all, and it was likely it might've been an engineer. 

The mistake you explain is just too clumsy to be true. Proximity sensors would've picked up the trains no matter where they are and put up an alert saying it was stuck in a certain section on a little diagram of the layout (normally a bit simplified). All the trains are highlighted on a rides layout if they are being actively used. 

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Mainly because the block system that rollercoasters employ is infallible. Block breaks automatically close until the next part of the track is clear and this is what happened at The Smiler because we know from witness reports that the train was stopped on the lift hill. What shouldn't be possible is that you can just over-ride the safety systems particularly in the event of a stalled train. 

 

I just checked and I am a bit wrong about it being standard procedure. BUT, for arguments sake, it is entirely possible that the Smiler could have had minor block section issues that day (not picking up trains and such small problems) which could open up the possibility that the op wasn't paying attention to the right camera, and just saw an empty brake run. Obviously the op cannot override anything, so an engineer was called to clear the block section as without doing so the ride could not have continued operation. Adding to this theory is the fact you cannot actually see the batwing element from where the engineer was, where they came from, etc. It also includes the fact that the train on the first lift hill will have stopped in the time it took the engineer to clear the block.

 

I will also point out that I am not in any way saying that this is the way it happened, I am merely making points as to how the Mail have tried to put it and I do not support the fact they are making speculation sound like fact in their article. Until the HSE release their findings no stories can really be believed. :)

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Did you miss the bit where I said they were all working on Stealth?

One person came down from the Swarm control room, pushed a few buttons, took the train off, came back from engineering a few minutes later, returned to the control room and sent the remaining train round once to test it, then let us on.

He was still there 2 hours later in the control room pushing the two buttons to launch the ride, so I guess he was an engineer moonlighting as a ride op then yes?

 

Oh I read it but ignored it as it's just not true.  There are separate engineering teams who are trained only certain rides in the park (similar to the rides staff), so they wouldn't 'all' be at Stealth

 

Engineers cannot operate rides in the day, as the rides are either handed over to 'Engineering' or 'Operations (Or a word of a similar effect)' - Unless the rules have changed

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I just checked and I am a bit wrong about it being standard procedure. BUT, for arguments sake, it is entirely possible that the Smiler could have had minor block section issues that day (not picking up trains and such small problems) which could open up the possibility that the op wasn't paying attention to the right camera, and just saw an empty brake run. Obviously the op cannot override anything, so an engineer was called to clear the block section as without doing so the ride could not have continued operation. Adding to this theory is the fact you cannot actually see the batwing element from where the engineer was, where they came from, etc. It also includes the fact that the train on the first lift hill will have stopped in the time it took the engineer to clear the block.

 

The Batwing is covered by the CCTV cameras though isn't it? Also the whole of the ride team and guests in the queueline would have been able to clearly see that the empty test car had stalled so I'm sure the operator and/or the engineer would have known what was going on with the ride.

That's why I think the computer must have played up a vital part in it. Unless it was a genuine mistake of the engineer accidentally advancing the train(which the ride system should have stopped anyway?) then a computer fault must have occurred to let the train full of people advancing into the next block section. Ovbiously as I've said we know nothing yet but the theory about trying to reverse the train and the computer playing up and instead advancing the train sounds plausible seeing as I'm almost certain that all of the ride team and engineers would have been fully aware of what was going on in the situation.

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Although it can, and I have shown that it can quite clearly, there are a million possibilities to how everything happened and I am just saying that he op may have been paying attention to the wrong cameras. As for the engineer knowing, if they went the way that I think they would have gone if this story is to be believed, they will not have been able to see the stalled train, and the public notifying the ride team and being ignored could be passed down to the fact that there were two trains that were "stuck", one being on the batwing and one being on the lift hill - they could quite easily believe that the public were on about the one on the lift hill and they (as reports that came out closer to the time suggest) just said an engineer was on it.

 

Again, I am just speculating just the same as everyone and until the HSE report is released try not to believe anything as fact, including what I say as all I am trying to do is figure out the most plausible way that the Mails article could make sense :)

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